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  Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is an important and basic element in 
Smart Grid systems. Technologies grow complicated as the world becomes more convenient. 
Power grid needs to be protected from potential cyberattacks, which may disrupt the power supply 
and result in huge economic loss and affect people's daily life. It is important to use secure 
communication technologies to enable various functions including bidirectional communications 
and remote controls. Since AMI needs to be widely deployed to each home user, power companies 
are required to build a large number of data concentrators to manage neighboring networks 
uniformly to ensure that meter data readings can be accurately collected as well as ensure the 
security of the data transmission process. Besides, since data concentrators are mostly deployed in 
the public environment, the devices are vulnerable to the impact from outside physical attacks. 
Therefore, this thesis proposes to construct an improved AMI communication network to increase 
security and lower its cost. The thesis discusses the security standard, and how the architecture for 
the AMI communication network is implemented using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
protocol based on the Software-Defined Network.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
 The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is the basic and important 
facility in the Smart Grid. The AMI system not only monitors the electrical system usage 
amount, it also combines the communication technology, and it provides bidirectional, 
and it has remote control function. Compare to the conventional meter, AMI brings more 
flexibility and advantages, e.g. it reduces manual collecting data cost, power shut down 
recovery management. With environmental awareness is rising, every countries start AMI 
project to provide electrical system management more efficiency. 
 Most of the power companies are not cooperating with Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) very effectively, thus, we want more fast, secure, and effective way to 
collect energy usage information. We usually set data Concentrator at the outside space 
and basement, through the Power Line Communication (PLC) or Wi-Fi, and it collects 
Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) metering information regularly, then the data 
concentrator sends the information to the central system through Wide Area Network 
(WAN) by day. In order to let meter having standard rule when it exchanges the 
information, the International Electro technical Commission (IEC) and other 
organizations set the standards. IEC 62056 is one of the standard that widely uses when 
the meter information exchanges. 
 The AMI architecture is based on the IEC 62056 standard, it includes 
standards of meter module information, and definition of minimum authentication 
security mechanisms, and the corresponding mode when it applies to different protocols. 
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Since the AMI combines with communication technologies, when the data is transmitting, 
it includes huge amount of user privacy, and very important control signal of meter. If it 
doesn’t have an appropriate security mechanism to protect AMI during the 
communication process, the information security should be concerned. Data 
concentrators are built in the public environment also it faces huge security challenges 
nowadays. 
 We improve AMI expansibility, availability, data transmit security, and we 
want to provide AMI a widely distributed characteristic. Therefore, we propose the 
method to use Software-Defined Network (SDN) technology as a new tool, and we develop 
a new AMI network system. Thesis uses Ethernet to transmit meter information, and we 
separate computer network with AMI network, and system maintains Quality of Service 
(QoS) to keep that AMI data throughput has enough bandwidth. If AMI works abnormal, 
the system can take the initiative to cut the throughput, and it keeps data concentrator 
availability. With the achievement of the above functions and analysis AMI standard rules, 
we can provide an effective AMI management. 
 The contribution of this thesis is that we integrate SDN with AMI, it can 
centralize and organize data flow easier and more convenient. If the attacks happen, the 
SDN controller can detect the malicious packet flow in time, and it only blocks single AMI 
instead of shutting down the whole system to protect power grid from the attacks in time. 
We use Ethernet to exchange data, it can improve expansibility and reduce costs. We also 
use virtual network skills to separate AMI throughput with other networks to ensure the 





  The smart grid generation is rising up; therefore, the traditional meter and 
manual operation process, this complicated procedures will be replaced by the AMI 
system, automated system, and communication system in the future. Fig. 1.1 shows that 
the smart grid collects and analysis electricity usage information by AMI, then it uses 
communication technology to send the information to the control center. Electricity 
resources   in every area will be scheduled very flexibly by using the control center, and it 
transmits price information directly to achieve real-time performance [1]. 
 
Fig 1.1: Bidirectional communication sketch 
  AMI compares with conventional meter, AMI combines with communication 
technologies, it can collect, monitor, detect by different communication protocols, and 
restart, remote control when system breakdowns. It can reduce the cost of manual 
collecting of data and maintain the system, also the efficiency can be improved. 
             In order to avoid the communication protocol incompatible, and system 
information cannot use between equipment, Utility AMI formulates the high-level 
requirements [5] which makes AMI suppliers can follow when they design and produce 
the AMI, and it includes 18 requirements, table 1.1 shows it. 
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  According to the AMI requirements, and we want to satisfy AMI security, 
consistency, scalability. International Technical Committee formulates the IEC 62056 
international standards for exchanging meter information. IEC 62056 [6] uses object 
recognition, modulation, access service, and it uses different protocol to communicate 
information, and it provides different suppliers and systems interoperability. It includes 
three different parts, Fig. 1.2 shows structure of COSEM: 
1. Companion Specification for Energy Metering (COSEM) [6] 
  COSEM is a common interface model which is established for object-
oriented methods. It is for the communication metering equipment. It allows us accessing 
the meter data through this interface, and it manages the energy meter. COSEM standard 
uses the model which we familiar, e.g. energy meters, water meters, gasoline meters, and 
it is defined as instrument interface. At the same time, the COSEM specification defines 
the object control interface and the communication channel.  
2. Device Language Message Specification (DLMS) [6] 
  It is an application layer based on the objected-model idea. It is in the 
application layer, it includes the encoding rules, and message interaction processes, and 
it corresponds error handling mechanisms between client and server. The specification 
and the underlying communication protocols are independent in the communication 
medium, and they are using to support applications, such as remote meter reading, 
remote control, and value-added services. At the application layer, meter objects use 
DLMS services to ensure interoperability and interchangeability.  
3. Transportation Layer communication protocol 
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  It includes: Part 47 [7] defines the transmission layer standards to provide 
TCP/IP transmission rules; Part 46 [8] defines information transmission layer standards, 
and it uses HDLC protocol; Part 42 [9] defines physical layer standards to provide GSM, 
twisted pair transmission standard; Part 21 [10] defines infrared transmission to achieve 
local information exchange. 
 
Fig 1.2 Structure of COSEM transportation layer and TCP/UDP service 
  As Fig 1.3 shows, smart meter includes many AMI system currently, and it 
highly relies on the communication infrastructure, it also makes the power system 
framework more complicated. The communication network not only has AMI network 
flow rate, it also includes Remote Terminal Units (RTU), Phasor Measurement Units 




Fig 1.3 Smart grid-application and communication network [12] 
  Therefore, we want to manage huge amount of equipment more efficient, 
and we let AMI has flexible expansibility and availability, and we want to satisfy current 
transmission and security rules. We have to figure out more intelligent and automatic 
management methods to centralize and optimize the smart grid.   
1.3 Thesis structure 
  In chapter 1 we introduce smart meter, and we describe the standard rules. 
Chapter 2 describes current AMI status, it includes the body framework, weak point, and 
risk analysis, relevant standard and testbed. Chapter 3 raises information security and 
communication protocol. Chapter 4 describes the details of the requirements. Chapter 5 
discusses the Software-defined network framework and how to combine it with AMI. 
Chapter 6 introduces system architecture. Chapter 7 shows the experiments and results. 
Chapter 8 concludes the paper and future works. 
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Chapter 2 Advantage/Disadvantage and Risk in AMI 
  Advanced Metering Infrastructure is the key infrastructure in the smart grid, 
it is a system which integrates traditional meter reading with modern communication 
technology. In this chapter, we discuss more details: framework, risk analysis, and smart 
grid advantages based on a software-defined network. 
2.1 Advanced metering infrastructure framework 
  Advanced metering infrastructure has two different communication 
networks, it is wide area network (WAN), and neighborhood area network (NAN). It has 
three important infrastructures: smart meter, data concentrator, and central system, as 
Fig 2.1 shows. 
        
Fig 2.1 Advanced metering infrastructure framework [11] 
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2.1.1   Communication Network 
1. Wide area network 
  Wide area network [15] is a data communication network that covers long 
distance, and forms by multiple local area network communication technical. The 
connection range can cover the whole country or even the whole world. 
2. Neighborhood area network (Local area network)  
  Neighborhood area network [15] uses as short distance information and it 
transmits between data concentrator and advanced metering infrastructure. It uses 
different types of cables as the transmitting medium, and it connects small-scale 
computer equipment together to achieve the purpose of resource sharing. 
2.1.2 Important infrastructures 
1. Smart meter 
  Smart meter [16] has three main functions, bidirectional communication, 
measurement, control function. Because it supports bidirectional communication 
between the meter and the supplier, the communication from the meter to the network 
may be wireless, or a fixed wired link, such as a power line carrier. 
2. Data concentrator 
  The main function of data concentrator [16] is the medium between central 
system and data concentrator. It provides the transmission of information and control 
signals through various communication technologies. Another function is that it can take 
and collect the meter information in the manage area, and it sends information to central 
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system. Therefore, data concentrator must have longer and bigger storage to save 
information.  
3. Central system 
  Central system [16] collects all user information from data concentrator, 
and it can calculate the last electricity data statistic, analysis, and it provides electricity 
company information for power dispatching and deploying. In addition, client can search 
their usage information, and bill details through the power company network platform. 
2.2 Advanced metering infrastructure weak point and risk analysis 
  Because of using communication technology to provide advanced metering 
infrastructure bidirectional function, AMI communication risks are being highly valued. 
In 2011, Ping-Hai Hsu, etc. proposed two levels of security [17]. It is high level and low 
level respectively. High level is the information transmitting between the central system 
and data concentrator by wide area network, the security mechanism uses public key 
infrastructure (PKI) as an end to end certificate; low level is the information transmitting 
between data concentrator and AMI by neighbor area network, it uses symmetrical 
encryption as information protection.  
  The data concentrator becomes an important medium for the control center 
and various communication protocol AMI types. It has bidirectional function, also it 
needs to collect and storage AMI information and control signals from everywhere. 
Therefore, if a low level security only uses symmetrical encryption, the security is not 
strong enough. Because of symmetrical encryption feature, data concentrator and the 
client must discuss a key to encrypt the data, but this will cause two problems.  
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  The first problem is the key confidential during date transmitting, another 
is that data concentrator needs to build different key with different clients, this behavior 
will let data concentrator to manage huge amount of keys. It causes key management too 
complex or inefficient. On the other hand, a data concentrator usually builds in the public 
area, under the public environment, it may have some external physical destroy, and it 
will have different impacts on AMI stability and data privacy.  
2.3 Advantages of smart grid based on SDN 
  Smart grid has widely distributed characteristic, and we want to maintain 
power infrastructure having high availability. We need to use reliable and secure 
communication techniques to keep data’s security when transmitting. Therefore, most of 
the companies use a special line or closed communication network as the solution, but 
this solution doesn’t achieve high efficient security also it costs too expensive to maintain 
the system. Some researches in recent years start using a software-defined network 
concept to the smart grid, we hope that we can use SDN advantages to improve quality of 
data transmission and security also lower the cost on system maintenance. 
                Xinshu Dong et al. [18] want to maintain the high availability of the smart 
grid, they aware that the cyber-attack is not only from the external network, it can also 
inject a back door attack to the equipment which just produces from the company. This 
kind of attack will make a heavy threat to the company. The conventional security 
mechanism such as firewalls is not enough to secure system, so it needs a more flexible 
detection mechanism. Therefore, they proposed the SDN concept into the smart grid, and 
the control center can deploy OpenFlow switch by the controller in order to surveillance 
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throughput and filter suspicious packet, also it prevents distributed denial of service 
(DDoS), and it keeps smart grid communication network available. 
  Jianchao Zhang et al. [19] observe that smart buildings not only improves 
life quality, also it can reach energy saving and reducing carbon emission by auto power 
switch. However, it needs efficient power management to build a huge amount of sensors 
and microcontrollers in the building, and SDN can help them on connection. It has 
flexibility and scalability, also it can achieve the purpose to customize control and 
management for the client.  
                Young-Jin Kim et al. [12] mention that the current smart grid needs to 
build a huge amount of sensors and controllers. Due to every equipment has different size 
packets and frequency, and network throughput is more complex and it is hard to manage, 
and if every equipment has their exclusive channel to transmit data, it can avoid mutual 
interference, and it can improve data’s security. Current virtual network technologies are 
increasing with the smart grid which is more popular, it is more difficult and complex to 
operate also it costs higher on maintenance. Therefore, they designed a SDN-based 
architecture solution for virtual utility networks (SUVN), they use network slice technical 
to separate every equipment throughput, and then they can manage different equipment 
network status respectively to enhance security. 
                Po-Wen Chi et al. [20] propose an SDN-based AMI threaten detection 
mechanism to make sure that AMI data flow in a wide area network will not be attacked 
by malicious modification. They use a rule-based detection system combined with SDN, 
and they use OpenFlow switch to detect abnormal throughput to provide efficient defense, 
and it can protect AMI from information threaten. 
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Chapter 3 Information/Communication Security Issues 
  Since the power grid integrates with communication technology, system 
becomes more complicated, and the information transmits in the network getting more 
dangerous. This security issue might causes huge damage such as if the cities blackout, it 
will put people in danger. Therefore we are going to discuss some attacks and 
communication protocol process. 
3.1 Common cyber attack 
  The attacks usually happen by some tempting motivation which makes 
attackers want to get. Power system is an important infrastructure for the human being, 
if the system is attacked, it might cause system breakdown, information leakage, stop 
working…, more serious, it could put people’s life and property in danger. Therefore, how 
to analyze and prevent an attack is a big issue for us. In this paper, we organize a common 
attack type and we divide them into four security requirements according to the attack 
characteristic. They are confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation. 
3.1.1  Confidentiality 
  Confidentiality in advanced metering infrastructure is an important 
security requirement. If the hacker gets energy consumption information and hacker 
saves it from meter via wiretapping, he can analyze the consumer life routine or observe 
if there are people live in the house. Therefore, the consumers doesn’t want any people or 
suppliers to save their information and personal privacy without authorization, and we 
want to avoid equipment in the home area network or other auto systems saves AMI’s 
information without authorization as much as possible. Meter Data Management System 
14 
 
(MDMS) also needs to keep consumer information in secret, so only the system has 
authorization can save information. 
3.1.2 Integrity 
  The meaning of integrity is not only for people that without authorization 
to modify data, it also protects control commands of system forged by hackers, it will let 
AMI be malicious operated without authorization. In addition, AMI needs to keep the 
entity integrated, and we need to prevent it from physical destroying. If the equipment 
was destroyed, it will cause energy usage information inaccurate, attacker can earn 
improper benefit and consumer will pay more money. 
3.1.3 Availability 
  When advanced metering infrastructure doesn’t work properly, it might 
derivative many problems such as the energy usage information can’t be recorded, 
especially when a data concentrator doesn’t work, it might cause big range AMI 
information collecting inefficiency e.g. hardware damage, software malfunction or 
communication interference and disconnection. Therefore, we need to use system 
detection to keep AMI availability and evaluate the method how we can reply to the center 
as soon as possible. 
3.1.4 Non-repudiation 
  Non- repudiation is the most key point in the AMI information exchanging. 
Because of AMI measuring energy usage information is the basis for expenses, if the 
consumer doesn’t admit that the information is correct, it will have a conflict on the side. 
In addition, the power company needs to identify the consumer who is legal or not, and 
the company wants to avoid that consumer impersonates to transmit meter information. 
15 
 
Therefore, they need to make sure each identities, they use asymmetric encryption 
technology, and it achieves non-repudiation by the correspondence between public keys 
and private keys. 
3.2 TLS communication protocol process 
  Transport Layer Security (TLS) [21] is widely using in the internet, it is a 
communication protocol to protect information security. Because of the advanced 
metering infrastructure build in the public network, if the meter’s data transmit without 
encryption or authentication source, the data information will be very easy to modify and 
wiretap. In this paper, we use the TLS communication protocol as the protocol when 
information transmitting to achieve confidentiality, integrity, correctness of the source. 
Current standard rules e.g. IEC 62351 [22] and NISTIR 7628 [23] are put TLS protocol as 
one of the security rules in data transmission protocol. 
                Transport layer protocol is the version that enhances Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) security and information integrity by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). 
They enhance the Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm and define more alert 
information e.g. decryption-failed, access-denied, certificate expired. Table 1.2 shows the 
difference between TLS and SSL. [47] 




  When client and server connect, it will start TLS connection process to 
exchange encryption and both certificates. If the protocol version aren’t same or 
certificate verification fail, it will disconnect to avoid any illegal communication, as Fig 
3.1. 
 
Fig 3.1 TLS communication protocol process [21] 
1. Step One 
  The client sends “Client Hello” message to server when they connect, it 
includes protocol version, encryption algorithm, and random number from client. 
2. Step Two 
  After server received “Client Hello”, it will reply “Server Hello” to client and 
compare both protocol version are same or not, and if they are different, it will disconnect. 
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Server sends the certification to client. The certificate is based on X.509 [24] standard, it 
is a digital certificate issued by Certification Authority (CA), it includes public key, identity 
verification, and it needs to make sure integrity and authentication. Certificate has digital 
stamp and expire day to protect it be modified. If server needs to confirm client is legal 
and safety, server will sent “Certificate Request”, and send “Server Hello Done” to client 
in the end, it means server connection process over. 
3. Step Three 
  If the server wants to verify client, after client receives “Certificate Request” 
from server, it will send certificate to server, and let server verifies if client is legal or not, 
then client starts check server’s certificate, if it is legal, then client can get the key from 
server’s certificate; otherwise, client sends an warning sign to server then disconnect. If 
the connect process goes well, client will send “Change Cipher Spec” and “Finish” to server. 
“Change Cipher Spec” is using to tell server that client is secure, and ready to 
communicate. They also use the encryption algorithm when they negotiate successful by 
each other, add encryption on “Finish” send to server and it verifies the connection is 
working well. 
4. Step Four 
  After server receives encryption data from client, it uses server’s private key 
to decrypt and verify. Server will send “Change Cipher Spec” to client and tell client that 
server is ready and communication is safe, and it uses encryption algorithm. Send “Finish” 
with encryption and transmit to verify connection. 
18 
 
  According to TLS communication, if client and server are both encrypt and 
decrypt successful, message can be verified correct, it means TLS channel is working well 
and connection is done. Both client and server can use this channel to encrypt, transmit, 






Chapter 4 Requirement Documents for AMI 
  About the AMI standard, many international organizations have formulated 
some standards already, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and 
the International Electrotechnical Commission formulated ANSI C12 and IEC 62056 
standards. The standards include the meter application layer information format, and the 
design of the physical layer communication protocol. Because security requirements are 
different in every country, they promulgate AMI standards very positively to meet the 
criterion. Such as Utility Communication Architecture International Users Group 
(UCAIug) promulgated AMI System Security Requirements [25] and AMI Security Profile 
[26] to give AMI supplier, and let them meet the standards; In Europe, British Energy 
and Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) formulates Smart Metering 
Equipment Technical Specifications [27] and Netbeheer Nederland formulates Privacy 
and Security of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure [28], both of them are asked for the 
security of meter. In addition, AMI can communicate with control center to make sure 
AMI will not affect the operation directly by whole power system. North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) formulates Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
standard [29], it formulates huge power system communication security rules to maintain 
huge power system and let control center can operate reliably. 
4.1 North America Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) CIP 
  With the smart grid is increasing, its equipment starts to combine and rely 
on communication technologies, but it also lets the power grid facing communication and 
information field’s threaten. When the transmission network and control center are 
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threatened by attackers or people who operates it incorrectly, it might cause big range 
power shutting down or other injuries, the loss will be uncountable. Therefore, NERC 
formulates the protection rules to make sure that the transmission network and control 
center can operate well.  
                NERC [29] is a reliable organization which was authenticated by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). They dedicate to formulate and execute some 
reliable standards, monitor a huge electrical system in North America, educate and train 
people they hired in this area. It uses some standards to protect the electrical system. E.g. 
NERC CIP 002 (essential communication property identity), NERC CIP 003 (security 
management control), NERC CIP 004 (related employee education), NERC CIP 005 
(Electricity safe boundary), NERC CIP 006 (essential communication property physical 
security), NERC CIP 007 (system management security)… 
4.2 New AMI Security Advices  
  Because the public enterprise purchased process and equipment supplier 
need to follow security rules when they build AMI [26], public enterprise communication 
user organization has AMI-SEC team and formulate an AMI security test standard, they 
proposed a standard of smart grid’s home area network port to meter data management 
system security method. This team studied AMI used cases, AMI risk evaluation, and 
security service analysis to modify and enhance the Department of Homeland Security’s 





Table 4.1 AMI development advice [26] 
 
4.3 Texas Electrical Network Communication Security Report 
  Since the smart grid incorporates with many advanced infrastructures, and 
it highly relies on communication basis infrastructure, it lead to our electrical system 
more complex, and it increases cyber attack’s risk, e.g. affect by weather, power grid 
hacker, or some technical problem. In Texas electrical network communication security 
report mentioned [29], Public Utility Commission (PUC) should put cyber-security as a 
target when they start building a smart grid and smart meter. Therefore, some public 
companies and organizations can participate in network security activities and training, 
and put more effort to learn cyber-attacks e.g. DoS, DDos…, they try to learn and know 
how to defense cyber-attacks in the future. 
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  They should embed some basic security functions to the system when they 
design or build the equipment to achieve their security. There are many organizations 
devote to formulate smart grid security standards, their goal is to provide professional 
technical skills and security, and they hope they can provide consumer and supplier 
quality assurance. Since new threaten keep increasing, most of these network security 
standards are using current standards to adjust or help, and make sure each system and 
equipment in the smart grid has good protection.  
4.4 Smart Meter Equipment Technical Standard 
  In England, advanced metering infrastructures include electrical meter, gas 
meter…, in order to keep infrastructures can at least maintain the lowest security and let 
it meets electricity supply licenses and gas supply licenses standards, England Ministry of 
Energy and Climate Change published Smart Metering Equipment Technical 
Specifications (SMETS) [27], when they settle AMI, it needs to meet the requirement to 
make sure the lowest security on physical, function, connect port and verify system to 
promote third party development of the AMI.  
   The connection method of smart meter standards, we want our software 
and hardware integrity, security, and availability, and communication quality of the 
equipment will not be affected when the fault happens. This standard shows that when 
smart meter executes any commands, response, or warning, it needs to encrypt and verify 
information’s integrity, source, and receiver correctness. Therefore, encryption algorithm 
needs corresponding to some higher level algorithms in order to hold their security. When 
smart meter receives any security update from firmware, it needs to wait for firmware’s 
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command for starting the installation or update. This procedure is to avoid the attacker’s 
malicious installation.  
  The connect port security needs to have the function which can detect 
communicate port on smart meter to avoid any information saved without authentication 
or send control command from home area network port leads to housing equipment 
malicious operate. According to above mentioned, if any abnormal happen, smart meter 
must record all situation and report to higher system.  
4.5 AMI Privacy and Security 
  Netherlands Grid Operator is highly focusing on privacy and security risks, 
because this risk in the power grid operator and the consumer will cause huge influence. 
Therefore, Netbeheer Nederlands decides to formulate strategies together [28], and it 
establishes national smart meter privacy and security team to manage privacy and 
security. All of the power grid operators need to follow the rules, they use the rules as the 
basic framework to design AMI, and they reduce damage which AMI might occur. 
                In this standard, it includes four types, general step, equipment detail 
requirement, information communicate requirement, and control center requirement. 
General step indicates that power grid operator needs to define and show their purpose 
on data collection, employee responsibility, AMI internal components authorization and 
personal identity. They set the security strategies at the same time; equipment detail 
requirement rules that the AMI and data concentrator entity must be protected and be 
able to detect entity level of damage. They need to use end-to-end encryption when they 
communicate to ensure information integrity, confidentiality, and source correctness; 
information communicate requirement shows that the power grid operator needs to use 
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cyber security step e.g. firewall, anti-virus software or invasion detect system to maintain 
smart meter’s communicated channel availability, security, and quality; control center 
requirement formulated that control center only communicates with the equipment 


























Chapter 5 Software-Defined Network 
  SDN creates network creativity, with each TCP / IP layer likely providing 
individual creativity. The SDN enables networks and software interfaces becoming more 
versatile and open, making it easier for network management. Compared to conventional 
networks, SDN will provide more accurate and precise traffic control. It gives network 
administrators the power to unilaterally change routing tables on routers, without having 
to deal individually with each router. It also offers the ability to create new services 
through virtualization. Finally, through the availability of the control plane, it provides 
better and more robust security. For example, each user may have different capabilities 
by the network to control their firewalls. [48] 
                SDN is used for several networking applications nowadays. For example, it 
is used for simplicity of network management, and the control of virtual machines in 
cloud computing and data centers. By removing proprietary architecture issues, it can link 
multiple data center networks. In this method, the concept of offloading workload can 
also be used for devices that require more powerful machines with other safety criteria. 
Finally, SDN can be used for internet testing, without modifying the current network, to 




Fig 5.1 SDN networks sketch 
5.1 Introduction of SDN 
  In 2008, Standford University initiates the SDN research project, based on 
software-defined network concept [30], they change traditional network control and data 
transmission function to the controller and OpenFlow Switch. They build network 
information more flexible, easier manage and control, and good enough to support the 
requirement of network changing fast. Network manager can program functions what 
network needs on the controller to manage information transmission and forwarding 
path in the switch. The Controller is formed by OpenFlow Protocol, Network Applications, 
and Network Operation System, it is in charge of switch’s packet transmitting and 
forwarding; Switch is to implement OpenFlow protocol, Flow Table and Secure Channel. 
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  According to the definition above, When OpenFlow switch receives packet, 
it will check the rule in flow table, and check if it corresponds to packet, then it forwards 
packet if it meets the rule; if it doesn’t meet the rule, it will follow the protocol and send 
packet with OpenFlow header information to the controller, and controller decides packet 
next step, then it replies the result to the switch through secure channel. Flow table in 
switch will add new rule and let switch dealing with packet at the same time. 
                With OpenFlow network architecture, we use controller to distinguish 
meter’s network throughput, and we design a method to separate general throughput with 
meter throughput. It can achieve security and monitor whole meter throughput status by 
controller, and it can also detect abnormal traffic anytime.  
5.2 SDN Controller 
  The key component of SDN-based system is the SDN controller. Controller 
has the functionality portion, and it can be regarded as a network brain. SDN controller 
collects information from network switches. By considering packet information, 
determination and response. The SDN controller is allowed to drop the packet, and it can 
establish a standard, and allocate standard to the switch. The SDN controller has two 
interfaces, one for user applications and the other for SDN switches. First of all, called the 
Northbound API. This API allows a designer to update the elements of the network from 
distant points. Including the REST calls, which is essentially sending queries to a specific 
web URL, it could be done in a few ways and it gets answers from them. We can use the 
answer for those purposes. The second interface is the rule that is sent from the SDN 





  FlowVisor [33] is a virtual network tool which builds on the OpenFlow 
protocol, and the main function is to do logical slice network on physical network, and it 
sets up many virtual networks on the network device, then separates each throughput as 
Fig 5.2 shows. It can let multiple controllers controlling one switch. FlowVisor is a tool 
between controller and switch, therefore, FlowVisor is according to the deployment rule, 
it lets switch forwarding throughout to the corresponding controller, as Fig 5.3 shows. In 
addition, controller can only control corresponding throughput, but it will not know the 
network which controls slices network from FlowVisor. We use FlowVisor to slice network 
can implement separating network throughput, and it lets AMI information throughput 
not affected by other information throughput. It is not only protecting AMI information 
bandwidth size also protecting information’s privacy and correctness. 
   




Fig 5.3 Multiple controller manage one switch together 
5.4 OpenFlow 
  SDN allows the control plane to communicate with the data plane by using 
those protocols. One such protocol is the OpenFlow. OpenFlow is the first standard 
interface for communication specifying between the SDN architecture’s control, and 
forward layers. It enables direct accessing and manipulating of the forward path, both 
physical and virtual of network devices such as switches and routers. In other words, it is 
a communication protocol that proposed to offer routing decision center (control plane) 
communicates between routers and network switches (data plane). Simply, it gives 
programmer leverage over router routing protocol. [48] 
5.4.1 OpenFlow Switch  
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  OpenFlow [2] switch main function is to manage flow in the OpenFlow 
framework, it includes three parts: 
(1) Flow Table: It uses controller, and it saves the action which sends from switch in the 
flow table, and switch can use this action to decide where flow to go. 
(2) Secure Channel: A secure channel between controller and switch communicate. 
(3) OpenFlow Protocol: Define how controller and switch communicate and transmit 
information. 
5.4.2 Flow Table 
(1) Header file: Flow’s header information, OpenFlow packets has the OpenFlow header 
different with other packets, it define all packet information e.g. source, destination. 
(2) Action: Deal with flow action, e.g. command packet in or out from which port. 
(3) Counter: Statistic packet information, e.g. packet send how many time, action table. 
 
 Fig 5.4 OpenFlow inner and connected with controller [2] 
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Chapter 6 System Architecture 
6.1 Comparison of AMI Communication Architecture 
  The AMI needs to build in every houses, and it always builds different 
environment, this will affect AMI location evaluating result, and we want to avoid that 
quality of information in data concentrator be affected. Also, data concentrator needs to 
build in public, it might suffer some physical attack from outside or cyber-attack inside, 
and it affects whole area. In this paper, network service suppliers play a role that has SDN 
already, and it uses SDN to provide network service for clients. We also integrate SDN 
advantages, and we propose a new AMI network communication architecture, we let AMI 
transmitting information through Ethernet, and we compare advantage and disadvantage 
with traditional AMI. 
6.1.1 Conventional AMI Communication Architecture 
  The conventional AMI communication architecture is shown as Fig 6.1. The 
data concentrator collects meter information in neighbor network every 15 minutes, and 
it consolidates information then transmits to the meter reading information management 
system in control center. We want to keep information integrity and availability, data 
concentrator uses middle and short distance transmission technical, e.g. Zigbee, PLC, it 
receives information in neighbor network, and wide area network usually uses long 
distance transmit technical, e.g. GPRS, LTE.  
                In information confidentiality, because of neighbor area network and wide 
area network are using different communication technologies; therefore, some 
researchers use two levels security method [17]. Neighbor network uses IEC 62056-53 
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security mechanism, and it allocates AMI and data concentrator encryption key from key 
distributed center; Wide area network uses public key infrastructure to manage data 
concentrator and meter reading data management system key by a special certificate 
center. This key can encrypt and decrypt information and verify it, so we can keep 
information integrity, legality, and we can check the source correctness to achieve two 
levels of security mechanism. 
 
Fig 6.1 Current AMI communication architecture [34] 
6.1.2 SDN Based AMI Communication Architecture  
  In this paper, we propose a new SDN based AMI communication 
architecture, as Fig 6.2 shows, we integrate SDN with AMI, and we let AMI transmitting 
meter information to data concentrator every 15 minutes by general household network. 
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We want to keep information’s confidentiality and integrity, the AMI uses TLS connection 
with data concentrator, also we keep information security and source authenticity. On the 
other side, we want to ensure that other network throughput not affects information 
transmission bandwidth, we use virtual slice network, and then AMI can have 
independent bandwidth.  
 
Fig 6.2 SDN based AMI communication architecture simulation 
6.1.3 Comparison between Traditional and SDN Based AMI Architecture 
  We do a comparison of the current communication architecture with 
software-defined network communication architecture. With this comparison, we can 
understand why the software-defined network can do much better work than current 
conventional architecture. Table 6.1 shows the comparison details. 
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Table 6.1 Current V.S SDN based communication architecture
 
 
  Current communication architecture needs to build lots of data 
concentrator, and it get meter information by different communication technologies, but 
it costs a lot of maintenance cost to build data concentrator, e.g. it needs at least two 
special lines on every data concentrator, and data concentrator has allowable number of 
specific connections, if connections exceed the allowable quantity it might cause data 
concentrator works abnormal. Therefore, it costs a lot to build the infrastructure. The 
more internet routing table, the more complicated it is. Current network architecture 
causes many problems which is becoming more and more inadequate. The switch and 
router must constantly extend and reassemble the packets to implement different 
network protocols, resulting in low transmission efficiency and unable to efficiently use 
the network bandwidth. In addition, there is a high risk of manually setting one by one. 
Once the network administrator enters the wrong command, it is easy to cause the 
network service paralyzed.  
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                Data concentrators usually build in public and open environments, the 
equipment entity is very easily destroyed from outside, it threatens AMI stability and 
information privacy. Therefore, we propose AMI integrate with SDN technology, and 
information exchanges under household network to centralize and manage AMI 
information destination. If some malicious attacks happen, the SDN controller can detect 
malicious attack packet in time, or it can block single AMI, malicious throughput in time 
to protect power grid equipment. The potential risk exists, e.g. if client plugs out meter 
system network cable or shuts down network connection equipment, it might cause meter 
system can’t transmit information. 
6.2 System Architecture 
  We use software-defined network advantage, and we propose new AMI 
network communication architecture. We use Floodlight [35] as SDN controller to 
manage and monitor meter throughput, and we use OpenSSL [36] to implement 
transport layer security (TLS) encryption channel as information transmission protocol 
to achieve information confidentiality, integrity, and source verification, then we use 
Raspberry Pi [37] embedded system as platform and simple Python to simulate meter 
information transmission, and we build a test platform as Fig 6.3 shows. This test 
platform follows standards to achieve user interface, throughput separated, bandwidth 
usage, abnormal detection, and active blocking, and we ensure AMI throughout 




Fig 6.3 New AMI communication architecture  
 
6.2.1 Controller and Switch 
  The main function for controller is to manage whole network throughput 
and packet direction, it masters network channel’s availability. We use computer with 
Ubuntu operation system to run control, processor is Intel I5-3470, and 16GB memory 
and two 1Gbps Ethernet network port. Floodlight use as the controller operation system. 
Switch is Pica8 P-3290 as OpenFlow switch with 48 1Gbps Ethernet network port. 
6.2.2 Data Concentrator 
  Data concentrator responses multiple AMI connection at the same time, 
and it receives meter information. This system is based on Ubuntu operation system, 
processor is Intel I5-3470, and 8GB memory, two 1Gbps Ethernet network port. When 
system starts running, it will wait AMI connecting with system by TLS communication 
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protocol, if connection is successful, it will receive meter information at regular time, and 
reply information to show that receive success. Fig 6.4 shows the process. 
 
Fig6.4 Data concentrator process 
6.2.3 Advanced Metering Infrastructure Simulate 
  We use embedded system Raspberry Pi [40] as our advanced metering 
infrastructure hardware, it has central processor Quad-core ARM Cortex-A7, 1GB 
memory, and 100Mbps Ethernet network port. When system starts, it connects with 
data concentrator by TLS communication protocol, after connection successful 
transmits meter information to data concentrator at definite time. We want to reduce 
information complexity, we use time mark to generate a measurement value, it 
follows IEC 62056-61 standards, and it lets AMI measuring value and related 
information maps to 6 different object identification number, then it transmits to 




Fig 6.5 AMI operation process 
6.2.4 OBIS identification number  
  DLMS and COSEM protocol use the object identification system [41] to 
make every value in meter, e.g. measurement value, data has united and unique 
identification number. In IEC62056-61 shows this standard details, companies can build 
identification number for their own meter information. OBIS is formed by 6 numbers as 
Fig 6.5.  [46] 
A B C D E F 
Fig 6.6 OBIS number 
  The code consists of 6 groups sub-identifiers marked by letters A to F. All 
these do not need to be presented in the identifier. Groups A and B are often omitted. 
They cover metering data as well as configuration of metering equipment and status for 
all applications. E.g. we can usually observe that if a meter has active power, its OBIS 
shows like 1.1.1.8.0.255. [41] 
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6.2.5 TLS Communicate Process (handshake) 
  We use TLS communication protocol to transfer information, and we ensure 
the information confidentiality, integrity and accuracy of the source. Before TLS connects, 
this system will make the asymmetric encryption pair of key, certificate and CA 
certificates, this pair of key have public key encryption transmitting information; receiver 
uses private key to decrypt, and validate identity by certificate; as a trustworthy third 
party, CA certificate is a certificate that verifies all identities correctly. Consequently, all 
devices certificate requires signature from CA certificate to prove that identity is checked 
by third parties. 
  When AMI and data concentrator connects, it starts TLS communication 
process to verify others correctness, we use Wireshark to prove communication process 
shows in Fig 6.7. 
 
Fig 6.7 TLS connect success 
  During TLS communication process, it shows alarm details and it 
disconnects if any particular version or verify goes wrong. This process can avoid 
communication illegally. As shown in Figure 6.8, when the opponent certificate has 





Fig6.8 TLS connect fail 
  It has an encryption type due to TLS communication procedure.   It includes 
certificate, encryption, certificate number of information, and key exchange encryption 
algorithm and it also meets most regulations. It makes information while transmitting, 





Chapter 7 Experiment Results and Discussion 
  We follow NERC CIP, Netherlands AMI privacy and security strategy and 
America AMI security standards to implement 4 system functions for designing 
experiment and test, and we prove that our AMI communication architecture meets 
standards, it includes: 
 Graphical user interface (GUI): GUI can observe AMI’s network topology and 
connection status, then we can monitor AMI network situation any time. 
 Throughput separated: Ensure third party can’t observe or get AMI’s packet 
information. 
 Quality of Service: Ensure AMI has enough bandwidth during information exchange. 
 Abnormal throughput detect and active block: If some abnormal behavior happen in 
AMI, we can block single infrastructure to protect power grid without block all 
infrastructures. 
7.1  Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
  The information management system is according to NERC CIP criteria. It 
is an essential resource in the control center. Therefore it must fulfill all the specifications 
of NERC CIP. NERC CIP 005 establishes the definition of electrical protective boundary 
where electrical safety boundary equipment communicates with exterior equipment, the 





7.1.1     Experiment purpose 
  We want our power providers knows the current AMI connection status and 
location of the equipment clearly and accurately, thus, it can handle the network status of 
all switches and it links equipment with controller management. By controller topology 
interface, we can observe all AMI networking under controller with data concentrator 
status and throughput. 
7.1.2 Experiment result 
  As Fig 7.1 shows, we use graphical user interface by controller to observe 
whole network topology. When we want to build new AMI, GUI can identify AMI’s 
location. 
 
Fig 7.1 Topology status 
  As Fig 7.2 shows, controller can search any packet router on OpenFlow 




Fig7.2 Throughput status 
7.2 Advanced Metering Infrastructure Throughput Separate 
  Due to the requirement of AMI privacy and security strategy conceived by 
the Netherlands power grid operator organization [28]. It includes that AMI throughput 
is transmitted via communication channel, quality, availability, and security of the 
channel should be guaranteed. One of the criteria suggests that people are unable to 
measure customer preferences from the size of the AMI packet and the frequency of 
transmission. Therefore, we want to ensure availability and security, we use FlowVisor 
network slice technique, and it separates AMI throughput from public network. 
7.2.1 Experiment architecture and purpose 
  In this paper, we use Ethernet to transmit data, and the bandwidth of the 
meter will share with the general computer. We want to make sure that the bandwidth of 
the computer network not influences AMI communicating bandwidth, and we maintain 
AMI having essential and adequate bandwidth. We use SDN technical virtual network to 
do the general network slice, and we let computer network throughput and AMI 
throughput be divided, then we let controller control network bandwidth be sliced. As 
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shown in Figure 7.3, power grid operator can control AMI throughput to ensure the 
throughput from another network which sends to the public company is not disrupted. 
 
Fig 7.3 Throughput separated diagram 
7.2.2 Experiment result 
  In Fig 7.4 shows, we use Raspberry Pi and computers to simulate meters 
and terminal equipment. 
 
Fig 7.4 Raspberry Pi 
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  Before FlowVisor sets, we can observe all equipment which plug into the 
switch and information, as Fig 7.5 and 7.6 shows. 
 
Fig 7.5 Before FlowVisor, GUI shows whole network topology has five equipment 
 
Fig 7.6 After FlowVisor, GUI shows complete network equipment and information 
  When we construct FlowVisor, and we set the rule for FlowVisor as Fig 7.7, 
the first and second commands mean that we're adding a slice and commands active, and 
we let special IP address controller to manage the network. Third and fourth commands, 
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we can observe the IP address of the packet source, and the IP address of the destination, 
the address of the Media access control and the destination executing the slice of the 
network to achieve throughput separated. 
 
Fig 7.7 FlowVisor information 
  We use FlowVisor as a tool, we separate switch port throughput, and every 
equipment plug into port 1 and port 11 are using as AMI, and others use as terminal 
equipment, and we can observe it from different controller. 
  Fig 7.8 and 7.9 show this experiment uses power grid operator controller 
visual, it can only observe AMI’s network topology and information, and it can’t observe 
other equipment on switch. 
 




Fig 7.9 Power grid operator controller’s GUI shows AMI information 
  The view of network service supplier, it can only observe other terminal 
equipment network topology and information, as Fig 7.10 and 7.11. 
 
Fig 7.10 Network service supplier controller’s GUI shows network topology 
 
Fig 7.11 Network service supplier controller’s GUI shows network information 
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  We want to do network slice, FlowVisor can follow packet IP address, MAC, 
or port. Because of this experiment is using Raspberry Pi to simulate the transmission of 
data, and it compares with actual AMI, Raspberry Pi produces a lot of unnecessary packet. 
It may trigger some discrepancies between real AMI. The aim of this experiment is to let 
people know that FlowVisor can implement this feature, and it can achieve separating 
AMI and other terminal equipment throughput, it only needs to do network slice on 
switch port. 
7.3 Quality of Service (QoS) 
  In this experiment, we ensure channel quality and availability, and let it not 
affected by household network. It may causes that AMI can’t exchange information with 
data concentrator. 
7.3.1 Experiment architecture and purpose 
  When terminal equipment are separated, we want to ensure quality and 
availability of AMI channels, and we want to prevent that other computer network 
throughput not influence AMI and results in packet loss, delay occurs, we use controller 
to command switch and start Quality of Service (QoS) mechanism. In order to ensure that 
the information bandwidth can achieve an effective working situation, QoS should take 
priority position on specific information. 
  Fig 7.12 shows experiment environment, and table 7.1 is the network details. 
We use Iperf [42] as network bandwidth testing tool, and we use Iperf to simulate general 




Fig 7.12 Implementation of QoS environment 
 
Table 7.1 Implementation of QoS network configuration 
 
7.3.2 Experiment result 
  We build a priority Queue to deploy in this trial. Queue is a first in first out 
buffer zone, it measures the throughput rate through this buffer zone, and it changes the 
throughput rate due to Queue state, and it reaches a restricted bandwidth. We set two 
Queues, Q0 and Q1. Q0 in our experiment is the AMI information throughput and high 
priority with network bandwidth of 0~20Mbps; Q1 is a common information rate, and 
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low priority with a bandwidth of 0~100network. When system launches, the low priority 
Queue can very change bandwidth flexibly, and it lets that high priority Queue has 
adequate bandwidth to use, and it can achieve QoS mechanism. 
  Because of server and transmitter only have 100Mbps network card, after 
test, we find out that overload bandwidth can achieve 94.4Mbps transmission rate; 
therefore, we set Iperf server 100Mbps rate to simulate as household bandwidth. The 
transmitter uses as household network equipment and AMI uses Iperf to keep sending 
TCP packet to the server during testing, then we observe that we achieve QoS or not. With 
this QoS strategy, it can occupy 20% of household bandwidth and it has high priority, and 
other household equipment which occupies 100% bandwidth has low priority. When AMI 
stops working, household equipment can use whole bandwidth; QoS starts working when 
AMI starts to transmit meter information, and we ensure AMI can have 20% of whole 
household bandwidth, and it is not affected by another throughput. Fig 7.13 shows the 
result. Blue line is general network; Red line is AMI network. 
 
Fig 7.13 Before/After AMI transmit information bandwidth  
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  At first, household network equipment starts sending information to 
extranet server by Iperf, as figure shows. Household network occupies almost 100 Mbps 
bandwidth, and AMI starts transmitting information after 10 seconds by Iperf, QoS starts 
working, and it adjusts household network bandwidth occupation percentage, and it is 
distributed to AMI which has high priority, and it lets that AMI throughput can transmit 
normally. After AMI transmission stops after 30 seconds, it returns 20% to household 
network. 
7.4 Abnormal Throughput Block 
  In this experiment, we need to follow Netherlands and America AMI 
security rules, when we verify that source identity is abnormal, and it fails three times, we 
need to disconnect communication equipment, and it reports to upper system. The main 
purpose is to avoid that any people without authorization access the information. 
7.4.1 Experiment architecture and purpose 
  If attacker wants to attack power grid, our data concentrator service can be 
challenged, and it may works abnormally. Therefore, if it fails 3 times, we count the 
outcome of the communication process, the data concentrator must report to the 
controller and it sends the IP address and MAC address of the alleged malicious attacker. 
Controller can block this address, and it tells switch to block the throughput from this 
address, and it achieves detection and controller handles it in time.  
7.4.2 Experiment result 
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  In Fig 7.14, IP address *.*.13.80 has three times connection failed, data 
concentrator records the IP address and MAC of this abnormal status, and controller 
keeps checking that if data concentrator has any abnormal connection, if it happens, 
controller receives abnormal connecting IP and MAC address which records from data 
concentrator, then it commands switch to block this abnormal throughput. 
 
Fig 7.14 Abnormal connect information record 
  After controller receives abnormal connecting IP and MAC address, it will 
check switch which connecting with this AMI, and it sends block-commands to switch, 
and it drops all throughput from this abnormal source. Fig 7.15 shows the detail. 
 
Fig 7.15 Controller’s move after receive abnormal information 
  Controller Floodlight provides us to observe packet router, the packet from 
MAC address b8:27:eb:ea:c8:94  is dropped, and Apply Action shows space which means 




Fig 7.16 AMI be block 
  We can observe from AMI (Raspberry Pi platform), when it fails three times, 
controller blocks it in time, it is not able to connect with it again. Shown in Fig 7.17. 
 
Fig 7.17 AMI disconnect information 
 
7.4.3 DoS attack experiment 
  If malicious attacker uses DoS to attack system, it might cause system 
overload beyond its capabilities. Most DoS attacks are based on the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities in the used communication protocol, such as TCP/IP protocol or the 
underlying data link layer technologies, and their related protocols. There are three 
common DoS attacks: TCP SYN Flood Attack, Land Attack, Ping Flood Attack... [43] 
  TCP SYN flood attack takes advantage of the flaws in the TCP handshake in 
three ways. The basic approach is: the attacker host sends a SYN message to the target 
host, and it initiates a TCP link, but the attacker host does not respond to the last ack 
message, making it difficult to complete the TCP handshake, and the target host needs to 
54 
 
devote resources to maintain this unfinished link until such a connection is reached a 
certain amount. The destination host can no longer address certain requests for 
connections. Construction of a SYNflood message is fairly simple, as long as the SYN bit 
is set to 1, and then it connects to a port of the target host available service. 
  The Land Attack uses two main methods: IP spoofing, and SYNflood. The 
Land Attack theory is filling in the target host IP as the source and destination addresses 
in the IP header, and then it encapsulates a SYN TCP packet to send out. The receiving 
host must, therefore, responds to the source address and maintain an unfinished 
connection, and the source address is alone, so this loop will inevitably cause the host to 
0 run out of resources, and it is not able to answer requests. 
  The Smurf attack is a method of attacking which combines IP spoofing with 
flooding attack. First, the message content is configured as a particular request to be 
replied to (such as an ICMP request), and the message source address is transformed into 
the target host to be targeted. The host receives the message must initiate a message 





Fig 7.18 Attack simulation diagram 
  We simulate SYNflood attack for experiment, the SYNflood tool command 
line uses to generate a SYN flood attack at the computer which we use as attacker. The 
fake TCP SYN packet sends to the target, and this attack can be triggered individually or 
simultaneously by the same attack host.  
  Fig 7.19 shows that if we set an attack host to attack the system, huge 
amount of the packets be forwarded to the server at time 300, and starts DoS attack. 
When the attack continues, the server breaks down at time 500 and starts losing all 
incoming packets. After controller detect attack from overload packet status from switch, 
it will disconnect the attack host computer by IP, MAC address, and smart meter can keep 




Fig 7.19 Packet flow during DoS attack 
  The percentage of packets lost rising drastically, almost 24% or more of the 
packets lost was capture by Wireshark. When the rate of DoS attack rises considerably, 











Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work 
  Currently, AMI security issue is the most important in whole world. If smart 
grid is getting popular, no matter power companies, equipment suppliers, or consumers, 
they all need more good standards and security methods to ensure their rights not under 
a dangerous environment. No one wants their smart meter information or personal 
privacy to be accessed by others. Also, they want to collect AMI information more 
efficiently, and lower the cost to achieve flexible expandability which is also a serious 
development target. 
                In this paper we implement that SDN integrates AMI communication 
architecture, with SDN concept to solve security and expandability problems in current 
communication architecture, and we follow international standards at the same time. 
  The methods we propose has many advantages: 
 Using Ethernet to exchange information, improve the expandability. 
 Integrate SDN, centralize mange AMI network status. 
 Using virtual network technology to separated general network throughput with AMI 
throughput to ensure security and availability. 
 Using TLS communication protocol to ensure confidentiality, integrity and source 
correctness when information transmit. 
  Although we have the above advantages to solve current AMI system 
problems, it still has a big range to enhance the system. E.g. If attacker destroys AMI from 
its entity, and because of SDN very rely on controller, if controller is attacked, it will stop 
the whole network system. Therefore, it is very valuable to do research on it. In this thesis, 
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we only simulate a small range of AMI systems. In the real world, power grid network is 
much bigger than our experiment, how to implement this concept to the real situation is 
the most important for us to figure out. I hope this thesis can give a big view to the people 
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